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I. Two VIEWS
Events since September 11, 2001 have produced a new round of debate
about law and the emergency powers of government. Citing the need for swift
and resolute action in a national emergency, the government has both sought
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new legal authority to combat terrorism and has suggested, in various spheres,
that some emergency powers are inherent in executive authority. On these
bases the Bush administration has secured the enactment of the Patriot Act,
expanding law enforcement's powers to fight terrorism; ordered the detention
of both foreign nationals and American citizens as unlawful enemy combatants;
proposed a system of military tribunals for such cases; and increased security at
a range of public facilities. Yet the legality of all these policies is contested;
even the proper analytic framework itself is hotly disputed. Does constitutional
law-either in the sense of constitutional rules or of constitutional outcomeschange in "emergencies," or is the law constant over time? Is there even an
emergency in the first place? Which institution or institutional process is
authorized to determine whether there is? In what follows we aim to cut
through these tangled debates to focus on the underlying concern about
emergency powers.
There are two main views about the proper role of the Constitution during
national emergencies. We label them the "accommodation" view and the "strict
enforcement" view. The accommodation view is that the Constitution should be
relaxed or suspended during an emergency. 1 During an emergency, it is
important that power be concentrated. Power should move up from the states to
the federal government, and, within the federal government, from the
legislature and the judiciary to the executive. Constitutional rights should be
relaxed, so that the executive can move forcefully against the threat. If dissent
weakens resolve, then dissent should be curtailed. If domestic security is at

1. The view that the Constitution accommodates, or should accommodate, special
restrictions on civil liberties during emergencies comes in three flavors. One is that the
Constitution itself provides, implicitly or explicitly, for greater executive power during
emergencies, and that this power is widely understood and accepted. Another is that the
expansion of executive power is accepted but not explicitly acknowledged, and courts (for
example) do and should exercise deference surreptitiously, by ducking legal challenges with
the help of the copious procedural mechanisms at their disposal-standing doctrine, denial
of certiorari, delay, and so forth. Bickel's passive virtues expand during emergencies. See
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962) (arguing that the Court
should temper principle with prudence by sometimes disposing of politically sensitive cases
on procedural grounds). A third is that the Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly
expand executive powers during emergencies but that government officials do, and should,
violate the Constitution when justified by emergency conditions. See Oren Gross, Chaos and
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011,
1023 (2003). These variants are of little interest: The second is a version of the debate on
judicial candor, an issue that is orthogonal to the question of emergency powers. As for the
third argument, it is always open to a public official to argue that obeying or enforcing the
law is immoral, and such an official may or may not succeed in persuading the public or
other officials who have the electoral or legal discretion to excuse him from liability. This
phenomenon is not particular to emergency. For a discussion of this argument in connection
with judicial enforcement of the fugitive slave law, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). For these reasons, we will
henceforth refer to the accommodation view generally and not distinguish among its
variants.
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risk, then intrusive searches should be tolerated. There is no reason to think that
the constitutional rights and powers appropriate for an emergency are the same
as those that prevail during times of normalcy. The reason for relaxing
constitutional norms during emergencies is that the risks to civil liberties
inherent in expansive executive power-the misuse of the power for political
2
gain-are justified by the national security benefits.
Many constitutions have had provisions that enhance executive powers
during times of emergency. The most famous example is also the most
unfortunate: the Weimar Constitution's provision granting dictatorial powers to
the executive in case of emergency. 3 But this is just one example among
many.4 In American constitutional law, Article I, Section 9 of the U.S.
Constitution authorizes Congress to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus
"when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."5
Although this emergency power was pointedly vested in the legislative branch
rather than the executive, 6 a more important constitutional rule is implicit but

widely recognized: During most major wars involving the United States,
Congress and the judiciary have deferred to the executive more than they have
7
during peacetime.
2. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 1-12 (2002); RICHARD
A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 292-308 (2003); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 218-25 (1998). This is the

conventional wisdom about the behavior of courts; and it has recently received empirical
support from a study of Supreme Court opinions. See Lee Epstein, Daniel E. Ho, Gary King
& Jeffrey Segal, The Supreme Silence During War (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors). For a qualitative study reaching the same conclusion, see John C. Yoo,
Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003)

(manuscript at 7, on file with authors) ("[Federal courts in wartime] have adopted a more
flexible, deferential standard of review than would apply to normal, peacetime governmental
actions."). For a striking declaration to the same effect by a sitting Justice, see Stephen G.
Breyer, Liberty, Security and the Courts, Speech to the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York (Apr. 14, 2003) (remarking that in wartime, "circumstances change, thereby
shifting the point at which a proper balance [between liberty and security] is struck").
3. GERM. FED. CONST., (Weimar Constitution, 1919) pt. 1, § 3, art. 48.

4. For a description of the provisions in France, Britain, and ancient Rome, as well as
those of the German Republic and the United States, see CLINTON ROSSITER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES
(Transaction Publishers 2002) (1948).

2.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
6. Historical evidence suggests that the Framers vested the Suspension Clause in

Congress, rather than the President, to diminish the risk of executive overreaching. See
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 145 (1980); cf U.S.

CONST. amend. Ill (in wartime, soldiers may be quartered in houses without the owner's
consent, but only in a "manner to be prescribed by law"-that is, by statute). With respect to
habeas corpus, as in other matters, the executive has accreted more power than the original
understanding might be understood to permit; Lincoln famously suspended the writ during
the Civil War. See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION (2003); J.G. RANDALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (Peter Smith ed., 1963) (1926).

7. See sources cited supra note 2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
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The second major view about emergencies, the strict enforcement view, is
that constitutional rules are not, and should not be, relaxed during an
emergency. 8 This view starts from the observation that the Constitution already
provides that the level of protection for civil liberties depends on the interest of
the government. Consider, for example, "compelling interest" standards used to
evaluate laws that discriminate against protected classes. When an emergency
exists, the government has a "compelling interest" in responding to it in a
vigorous and effective way. Thus, laws that would not be tolerated during
normal times are constitutionally permissible during emergencies. Racial or
ethnic profiling, for example, is likely to be seen as less objectionable when
used to prevent a terrorist attack than when used to interdict the distribution of
illegal drugs. 9 The Constitution should be enforced "strictly"--that is, the rules
should be the same during emergencies as during normal times, even if
outcomes differ-so that both civil liberties and government interests such as
national security can be appropriately balanced, as they always need to be.
Although the strict enforcement view and the accommodation view can be
given different doctrinal formulations, what interests us is the degree of
deference that courts give the executive during an emergency. Stipulate that
judges could provide "high" or "low" deference during emergencies, where
high deference permits some aggressive executive actions that are prohibited by
low deference. High deference could be implemented through a threshold test:
Courts will apply strict scrutiny unless they first find that an emergency exists,
in which case they will permit any executive action that has a rational basis.
High deference could also be implemented through a relaxed version of the
ordinary compelling interest test, where judges find that the government
interest becomes more compelling whenever an emergency occurs, whether or
not there is a formal declaration (by courts or other officials) that an emergency
exists. Correlatively, low deference could result from the refusal to treat
constitutional rights differently during emergencies and normal times, or it
could result from the use of a strict compelling interest test. We do not take a
Rights similarly permits states to derogate from their obligations under that instrument "[iun
time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation." International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 4, S. EXEC. Doc. No. E, 95-2, 23, 24 (1978),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
8. See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on
Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 28-30 (2003); Norman Dorsen, Here and There:
Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 840, 845 (1989) (arguing that civil

liberties can be judicially protected without necessarily resulting in a negative impact on
national security). Below we discuss other authors who hold this view.
9. For completeness, we should mention a variant of the second view, which holds that
not only rules but outcomes should remain the same during emergencies and normal times.
On this view, emergency measures are permissible only if they would be permissible if taken
during normal times. Racial profiling, for example, if not permitted for drug interdiction, is
also not permissible for deterring terrorism. Although we do not know of anyone who clearly
endorses this view, it approximates the position of those who are most hostile to the Bush
Administration's post-9/11 antiterrorism policies. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 8.
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position on these issues; the public and scholarly debate is not, for the most
part, about doctrinal formulations but about the degree to which judges should
defer to the executive.
Whatever the doctrinal formulation, during normal times the
accommodation and strict enforcement view permit the same kinds of executive
action, and during war or other emergency the accommodation view permits
more aggressive executive action than the strict enforcement view does. We
assume that courts provide extra deference during an emergency or war
because they believe that deference enables the executive to act quickly and
decisively. Although deference also permits the executive to violate rights,
violations that are intolerable during normal times become tolerable when the
stakes are higher. Now, one could criticize courts for getting the libertysecurity tradeoff wrong during emergencies, just as one could criticize courts
for getting the liberty-security tradeoff wrong during normal times. But in the
current debate civil libertarians make a more ambitious claim: That executive
action is more likely to be worse during emergencies than during normal
times-and that therefore the accommodation position taken by judges is a
mistake.
On what grounds could one argue that judges have erred at the wholesale
level? Civil libertarians argue that even if judges are right that the benefits from
decisive executive action rise during emergencies, judges systematically
overlook two costs or risks that are special to emergency. The first overlooked
cost is the long-term, postemergency institutional damage from accommodating
aggressive executive action during an emergency. The second is the risk that
during an emergency fear leads to bad policy.
The institutional argument is that emergencies work like a ratchet: With
every emergency, constitutional protections are reduced, and after the
emergency is over, enhancement of constitutional powers is either maintained
or not fully eliminated, so that the executive ends up with more power after the
emergency than it had before the emergency. With each successive emergency,
the executive's power is ratcheted up.
The other argument is psychological: During an emergency, people panic,
and when they panic they support policies that are unwise and excessive.10
Relaxation of constitutional protections would give free rein to the panicked
reaction when what is needed is constraint. Normal constitutional protections

10. Id. at 2-3 (emphasizing the role of "mass fear"); Gross, supra note I (attributing
government responses to fear); Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime 38 (Jan. 15,
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) ("Time after time, we have allowed our
fears to get the better of us."). For an example from the popular press, see Editorial, A
Panicky Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at A34 (calling the Patriot Act "panicky
legislation"). For a general discussion, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 129-41, 157-61 (2000) (discussing the
use of constitutions to prevent majorities from acting in the heat of passions; Elster does not
limit himself to emergencies).
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hinder the enactment of bad laws during emergencies. To the critic who argues
that normal constitutional protections also prevent needed concentration of
power in the executive, the defender of strict enforcement argues that any
hindrances on forceful executive action would be justified by the benefits, the
avoided laws and acts that reflect fear rather than reason.
The ratchet theory and the panic theory have become fixed points in the
debate about emergency powers yet have escaped rigorous analysis. As we will
show, both theories have conceptual, normative, and empirical difficulties. The
ratchet theory lacks a mechanism that permits constitutional powers to rise and
prevents them from falling and makes implausible assumptions about the
rationality of individuals who consent to constitutional changes during
emergencies. Those who fear the ratchet's power point to constitutional
trends-such as the rise of executive power-that are more plausibly the result
of long-term technological and demographic changes, not of recurrent
emergencies; they ignore the possibility of constitutional trends in the opposite
direction, such as the rise of individual rights. (If there is such a trend, it is not a
ratchet process either; we include a critique of an optimistic variant of the
emergency ratchet, in which a succession of emergencies causes government to
display ever-increasing respect for civil liberties.) As for the panic theory, it
relies on a psychologically unrealistic conception of fear and on dubious
empirical assumptions about the influence of fear on public policy. Finally,
defenders of either theory do not examine their normative premises sufficiently:
It is not clear that panics and ratchets, if they occur, are bad things. Fear is
often the correct response to a threat; panics can shatter constitutional
structures, but sometimes constitutional structures should be shattered. Ratchets
put the status quo out of reach, but sometimes that is where it should be.

II. RATCHETS
In this Part we critique accounts of emergency that posit a ratchet effect, in
which a succession of emergencies produce a unidirectional, and irreversible,
increase in some legal or political variable. Part II.A provides a brief overview
of ratchet accounts in legal theory, questioning their general utility. Part II.B
critiques the most common version of the emergency ratchet account, which
holds that emergencies produce a statist ratchet: an irreversible trend towards
increased state power and official suppression of civil liberties, free speech, and
political association. We suggest that the statist ratchet account is implausible
on conceptual, institutional, psychological, and normative grounds. Part II.C
critiques the opposite account, which holds that emergencies produce a
libertarianratchet in the form of ever-increasing governmental respect for civil
liberties. Part II.D suggests that the ratchet idea has little utility for positive or
normative argument about emergencies, principally because ratchet accounts
posit an implausible amount of friction in the lawmaking system. In our picture,
by contrast, the lawmaking system adjusts fluidly, if unpredictably, to
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emergencies, exogenous shocks, and other changes in the political and social
environment; few changes are unidirectional and irreversible in the strong sense
that ratchet accounts suppose.
A. Ratchets, In General
The "ratchet" (or, redundantly, the "one-way ratchet") is a favored analytic
tool of legal theorists. Too much so, in fact. Ratchet accounts are invoked in a
bewildering array of settings, ranging from the theory of regulation and
bureaucratic behavior I to racial profiling' 2 and sexual mores. 13 For a genuine
ratchet to occur, however, highly specialized conditions must obtain. The
essential features of a ratchet are unidirectionaland entrenchedchange in some
legal variable. First, the policy space in which the ratchet occurs is assumed to
be one-dimensional, so that the ratchet produces ever-increasing values of a
variable-more and more and more of something. Second, the incremental
increases are fixed once they occur. Note that the change need not be literally
irreversible; although strong ratchet accounts posit irreversibility, weak ratchet
accounts merely posit that change is sticky, because more or less costly to
undo. Weak ratchet accounts seem more plausible than strong ones, but they
also pack less punch: The less costly it is to undo a given change, the less
important is that change.
Putting these conditions together, a well-formed ratchet account must have
something like the following shape: At Time 1, some legal rule or practice
emerges endogenously from political processes, including the legal system; at
Time 2, the rule or practice is cemented by some mechanism and has become
an exogenous constraint; at Time 3, some dimension of the rule increases
endogenously; at Time 4, the increase is cemented into place; and the process
repeats indefinitely. These conditions are rare, perhaps even nonexistent. The
danger here is that the "ratchet" label is being bandied about too freely and is
often confused with a simple trend that happens to extend over time or with
endogenous but reversible change in some variable that would quickly revert to
its original value if other legal or social conditions changed.
Despite the ubiquity of ratchet accounts, few such accounts are fully
specified, and often there is no plausible way to cash them out. Take a popular
idea, or intuition, in constitutional theory: If conservative judges respect
precedent while liberal judges freely overrule precedents, and conservative

11. Larry F. Darby & Joseph Fuhr, Investment Incentives andLocal Competition at the
FCC, 9 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 1, 18 (2000); Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The
Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the
Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 148 (2001).
12. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of Chance: Actuarial Models and Criminal
Profiling at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 105, 124-25 (2003).
13. Amy L. Wax, Against Nature-On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, 63 U. CHI.
L. REv. 307, 340-41 (1996).
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courts alternate with liberal ones, then a ratchet effect is created, whereby the
existing stock of precedents becomes increasingly liberal over time. But this
account is either out of equilibrium or arbitrarily assumes that the two camps
have wildly disparate preferences. If the implicit picture is that both liberal and
conservative judges are political, seeking to embody their preferences and
attitudes in legal decisions, then conservative judges are myopic in refusing to
overrule liberal decisions; they are repeatedly, and inexplicably, duped by the
equally unprincipled but more cunning liberals. So the picture must instead be
that liberal judges are political while conservative judges have a strong and
principled preference for adhering to any past decision, whatever its political
valence; but this seems arbitrary.
Perhaps history contains a few genuine ratchet processes. The continual,
and doubtless irreversible, expansion of the political franchise in liberal
democracies over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries might
qualify. But even here there are problems; although it seems intuitive that
voting rights, once granted, are difficult to revoke (assuming the recently
enfranchised may themselves vote on any revocation proposal), it is not
obvious why enfranchised groups would continually admit politically
powerless groups into the political system. In general, ratchet arguments are
methodologically suspect and are invoked with far greater frequency than is
warranted by theory or evidence. This pattern holds true for ratchet arguments
about emergency powers, to which we now turn.
B. The Statist Ratchet

The statist ratchet identifies a putative tendency of emergency policies to
"become entrenched over time and thus normalized and made routine ....The
maintenance of emergency powers may be accompanied by expansion over
time of the scope of such powers. At the same time, built-in limitations on the
14
exercise of emergency authority and powers tend to wither away."
As it turns out, however, the statist ratchet account has only a surface sheen
of plausibility, and no core. It assumes that emergencies produce unidirectional
and irreversible change in the direction of official intrusion on civil liberties.
But there is no obvious reason to think that any such process occurs; the statist
14. Gross, supra note 1, at 1090; see also JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS:
POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 54 (1991) ("[D]esperate measures have a way of

enduring beyond the life of the situations that give rise to them"); George J. Alexander, The
Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5

HUM. RTs. L.J. 1, 26-27 (1984) (emergency decisions may "infest law long after the
emergency has passed"); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98

YALE L.J. 1385, 1397-1421 (1989) (attempting to show that successive wars and crises have
steadily expanded executive authority at the expense of civil liberties); Terry M. Moe &
William G. Howell, The PresidentialPower of UnilateralAction, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132,
157 (1999) (analyzing "the ratchet effect of expansion of accepted authority in the office of
the president with each new emergency").

HeinOnline -- 56 Stan. L. Rev. 612 2003-2004

December 2003]

A CCOMMODA TING EMERGENCIES

ratchet fails to supply a mechanism that would explain such a process if it were
to occur; and, if there is such a mechanism, it is not clear that the resulting
ratchet process is bad. We will organize these points into four critiques of the
statist ratchet: conceptual, institutional, psychological, and normative.
1. Conceptualproblems.
The statist ratchet, like all ratchet accounts, assumes a finite, onedimensional policy space. In this space, government policies vary from
minimally to maximally intrusive; the statist ratchet assumes that emergencies
produce a continual increase that is unidirectional on this dimension, moving
steadily from less official oppression to more.
But this picture is too crude. The policy space is not one-dimensional but
multidimensional: Official policies, whether instituted during an emergency or
not, can intrude more (or less) on some margins while intruding less (or more)
on others. At Time T the government policy for airport security is to search
passengers who fit a given ethnic and religious profile. At Time T+I the policy
changes to random searches; the new policy, let us say, imposes a cost (at least
in an expected sense) on a greater number of people but reduces the stigma of
being searched. Here it is senseless to ask whether liberty has been increased or
decreased; instead it has been redistributed, by imposing a smaller deprivation
more widely. In addition, there is the standard problem of conflicts or tensions
between and among libertarian rights, arising from budget constraints on the
government that funds the institutions needed to protect those rights. 15 More
money for airport searches may reduce the need for ethnic profiling, but it may
mean less money for public defenders or a longer court queue for citizens
asserting constitutional liberties against government.
These two problems--controversial choices about the distributive profile
of libertarian rights and the interdependence of budgeting choices that affect
rights-mean that officials face the difficult problem of aggregating
incompatible liberties across different individuals. In rare cases, Paretoimproving moves will enable greater security at a given level of official
intrusion or less intrusion with a constant level of security; 16 but in most cases
more liberty for some means less liberty for others. Because aggregative
judgments are inescapable, it is not so much wrong as incoherent to speak
generally of "society" having "more" or "less" liberty.
To be sure, these conceptual problems are not dispositive in and of
themselves. We might discover, empirically, a decrease of liberty on all

15.

See generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTE1N, THE COST OF RIGHTS (1999)

(explaining that rights are implemented by affirmative government decisions to fund
protection for those rights).
16. Pareto improvement is usually defined over utility rather than liberty, but the latter
idea is perfectly coherent. See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 25-26 (1992).
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dimensions or on some suitably weighted or aggregated combination of
dimensions. What is true, however, is that ratchet arguments must carefully
specify the relevant dimensions and examine their interaction. The simple
picture of unidimensional, unidirectional change embodied in the most
common versions of the statist ratchet does not begin to engage these
conceptual problems.
Finally, the boundaries of the policy space themselves change over time.
Exogenous shocks arising from technological, economic, and social change can
transform the policy arenas in which the balance between security and liberty is
played out. Governments that had managed to assert some level of control over
traditional media must cope with the arrival of the Internet; by the time the law
surrounding cross-border policing has been adjusted to the Internet, 17 perhaps
personal teleporters will have come into use, and the traditional customs post
will seem irrelevant for people as well as for information. Unanticipated change
undermines government's ability to control liberties. In place of the menacing
picture drawn by the statist ratchet, envisaging a continuous increase of official
power over information and personal conduct, we might imagine government
as a rat on a treadmill, constantly struggling to keep pace with new forms of
technology and new modes of citizen behavior.
2. Institutionalproblems: Is there a mechanism?
Statist ratchet accounts fail to specify any institutional mechanism by
which legal and political measures intended to combat emergencies become
irreversible. Why, exactly, do temporary measures stick after the emergency
has passed? Although statist ratchet accounts usually gloss over this point, we
can imagine several related mechanisms. First, judicial precedent developed in
times of emergency might distend or spill over into the ordinary legal system,
and precedent will be costly to overrule. Second, legal rules developed in times
of emergency may be protected by the status quo bias built into the legislative
system or by the formation of bureaucracies and interest groups that coalesce
around the new measures and block subsequent efforts to repeal them. We
critique these ideas in turn.
Precedent. The locus classicus for the argument from precedent is Justice
Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. United States, with its famous claim:
[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes [an emergency] order to show that it
conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show
that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated ... [a] principle [that] lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent

17. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border
Searches, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103.
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need. 18

Jackson's preferred course of action was not to invalidate the order but to
treat it as nonjusticiable-a version of the political question doctrine.
Expanding upon (and modifying) Jackson's dissent, commentators such as
Gross and Tushnet argue that "it is better to have emergency powers exercised
in an extraconstitutional way, so that everyone understands that the actions are
extraordinary, than to have the actions rationalized away as consistent with the
Constitution and thereby normalized."' 19
Jackson's idea is obscure, and the position commentators have derived
from it is implausible. Suppose that, contra Jackson, judicial precedents
explicitly uphold government actions in a time of crisis on the ground that the
emergency justifies the order, even if a similar order would be invalid in
ordinary times. Why must the precedent both (1) spill over into ordinary law
and (2) remain entrenched "for all time," as Jackson puts it? As for the first
condition, the precedent will itself have a built-in limitation to emergency
circumstances. Presumably the idea is that precedents are extremely malleable,
and the category of "emergency" is a fluid and unstable one. But if this is so it
is so in both directions; later judges may either distend the precedent to
accommodate government power or else contract the precedent to constrain it.
Jackson's exegetes need to supply an independent account to explain why the
former possibility is more likely, and more harmful, than the latter; and they
have not done so.
The best stab at an account of this sort appears in another Jackson opinion.
Institutional incentives will cause the executive to press the boundaries of the
"emergency" category to ever-broader extremes, and that will be possible
because the category of "emergency" is extraordinarily nebulous and difficult
to specify through legal formulations. Cognitive limitations will induce the
courts to acquiesce in this expansion. Because the courts will be aware of the
limits of their information and of the high risks of error if they frustrate
20
executive action in a genuine emergency, they will adopt a deferential stance.
This reconstructed argument seems plausible as far as it goes, but rational
judges who are aware of their cognitive limitations-and this account assumes
self-awareness--can anticipate the slippage and forestall it, by initially defining

18. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
19. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime,
2003 Wis. L. REv. 273, 306. For Gross' similar view, see supra note 1, at 1125. Tushnet is
quite explicit that Jackson "does not quite make the point I extract from his opinion."
Tushnet, supra, at 306.
20. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (describing the federal government's war power as "dangerous" because "[i]t
usually is invoked in haste and excitement [and] ...is interpreted by judges under the
influence of the same passions and pressures. Always . . .the Government urges hasty
decision to forestall some emergency or serve some purpose and pleads that paralysis will
result if its claims to power are denied or their confirmation delayed.").
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the category of emergency more narrowly than they otherwise would. The
eventual expansion of the category will simply reinstate its optimal scope,
rather than exceed it.21
At bottom, the Jackson view must rest on a simple empirical conjecture:
The expansion of emergency powers, once begun, will inevitably culminate in
total executive domination. But this seems hysterical; there is no evidence for it
in the study of comparative politics. Many constitutions contain explicit
22
provisions for emergency powers, either in text or in judicial doctrine.
Sometimes executive domination has overtaken the relevant polities,
sometimes it has not; other variables probably dominate, such as the nation's
stage of development, or its susceptibility to economic shocks, or the design of
legislative and judicial institutions. Recall the status quo position: Judges
typically defer to the executive in war and other emergencies, as we have
emphasized. 2 3 Jackson's exegetes seek to change this status quo and thus bear
the burden of proof. They need to show that recognizing a legal category of
emergency powers, or increasing the level of deference during judicially
identified emergencies, will risk pushing the Constitution to the bottom of the
slippery slope. A casual citation to a few salient examples, typically the
emergency provisions of the Weimar Constitution, will not carry their
intellectual burden.
As for the second condition, it is hard to see why precedents granting
government emergency powers should be irreversibly entrenched, at least if
precedents denying the government emergency powers are not. Stare decisis
will be either strong or weak. If it is weak, then past precedents granting
emergency powers can be overruled, even if they cannot be cabined to
emergency situations. If stare decisis is strong, then courts will be unable to
overrule precedents that previously denied government emergency powers in
particular settings, or that strongly entrenched liberties, as well as precedents
that granted emergency powers. Here too the argument from precedent cuts in
both directions. There is no ratchet mechanism that uniquely applies to
precedents upholding government claims of emergency power; the general
stickiness of precedent is a far broader point.
Legislation (and constitutionalamendment). The argument from precedent

points to the inertia built into the judicial system; there is a similar argument
that points to the inertia of the lawmaking system, embodied in the costly

21. For an account of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
that explains Black's opinion as an example of this strategy, see Adrian Vermeule, The
JudicialPower in the State (andFederal)Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REv. 357,404-05 (2001).
22. See COPING WITH CRISES: How GOVERNMENTS DEAL WITH EMERGENCIES (Shaochuan Leng ed., 1990) (providing detailed case studies of emergency law from Israel,
Northern Ireland, Italy, South Korea, and Taiwan); EUROPEAN COMM'N FOR DEMOCRACY
THROUGH LAW, EMERGENCY POWERS (1995) (providing an overview of legal provisions on
emergency powers from 32 nations).
23.

See supra note 2.

HeinOnline -- 56 Stan. L. Rev. 616 2003-2004

December 2003]

A CCOMMODA TING EMERGENCIES

procedures for statutory enactment and constitutional amendment. These design
features partially entrench the legal status quo; the statist ratchet account might
implicitly suppose that temporary legislation or constitutional provisions,
enacted during emergencies, will thus stick after the emergency has passed. But
rational and well-motivated legislators can anticipate this by inserting sunset
provisions in emergency legislation (as Congress did in the Patriot Act);
rational and well-motivated constitutional drafters can insert sunset provisions
in constitutional rules. 24 Gross argues that "[t]ime-bound emergency legislation
is often the subject of future extensions and renewals," 25 and there are current
proposals to extend the Patriot Act or repeal its sunset clause, but the existence
of the sunset clause alters the status quo point: Unless proponents of extension
can surmount the costly hurdles to legislative action, the statute will lapse
automatically. Thus libertarian opponents of renewal still enjoy the advantage
of legislative inertia.
The statist ratchet account must suppose that legislators either irrationally
fail to anticipate the future termination of the emergency, perhaps because they
are gripped by "panic," or else that legislators are motivated to use any and
every emergency as a means to expand the permanent powers of government.
We address "panic" at length in Part III below. As for motivations, the idea that
legislators desire to maximize permanent state power as against the individual
is vivid, but it lacks microfoundations in the behavior of the individuals who
occupy the legislature. Why, exactly, does it benefit legislators to expand the
powers of government? As individuals, they may or may not benefit; even if
legislators have an individual stake in the power of Congress as an institution,
expanding government power in times of emergency usually benefits the
executive most of all, and the executive is Congress' principal institutional
rival. The statist ratchet fails to offer a plausible account of legislators'
maximands. We might posit that legislators strictly maximize their chances of
reelection, but then the question just becomes why constituents demand
legislation that (for lack of sunsetting) will outlive the emergency, and the
picture must be that during emergencies constituents irrationally demand
permanent legislation; so we are back to the "panic" idea again.
Even accepting the premise that legislators are frequently irrational or ill
motivated, pointing to the status quo bias built into the lawmaking system
proves too much. The status quo bias operates neutrally across different types
of statutes and constitutional provisions. It not only (1) entrenches libertyrestricting laws (the only case the statist ratchet acknowledges) but equally (2)
prevents enactment of liberty-restricting laws, and (3) entrenches libertyprotecting ones. As for case (2), the high costs of statutory enactment can weed
out the most draconian proposals for controlling sedition and terrorism; an
example is Senator Chamberlin's 1918 proposal to enact legislation that would
24. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id.
at art. V.
25. Gross, supra note 1, at 1090.
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allow the government to punish spies by court-martial, which was killed by
Wilson's opposition. 26 As for case (3), the costs of enactment protect from
repeal any laws that protect liberties from infringement by later legislatures or
the executive. Consider the Posse Comitatus Act, 27 which blocks the executive
from using regular armed forces for domestic law enforcement and thus
embodies a traditional libertarian anxiety. The Act is just as entrenched by the
lawmaking process as the Patriot Act would be, had Congress not provided a
sunset.
Bureaucraciesand interest groups. A related mechanism might posit that
emergency policies generate bureaucracies that block the repeal of those
policies. On this view, creating new agencies to cope with an emergency,
perhaps by consolidation of old agencies (as with the Department of Homeland
Security), creates a cadre of officials with vested interests in prolonging the
new bureaucracy for as long as possible, even after the emergency has petered
out. Those officials will use their influence, in Congress and with client interest
groups, to block repeal of the agency's organic statute or diminution of the
agency's power.
It is hardly clear that bureaucratic immortality is a real phenomenon; that
sort of talk had more resonance before Congress abolished the Interstate
Commerce Commission, deregulated the airlines, and reorganized and
streamlined the security agencies. The same problems we have discussed-the
underdeveloped account of officials' maximands and the mismatch between the
scope of the mechanism and the scope of the argument-persist here as well. It
is unclear why rational legislators would fail to anticipate and block the future
bureaucrats' strategy by inserting a sunset termination provision, a periodic
review process, or some other device. And if bureaucratic inertia is a real
phenomenon, it operates equally to block moves that would expand
government power, restrict liberty, or permanently institutionalize a state of
emergency. If an inefficient welter of competing security agencies hampers
government's efforts to extend control over unpopular social groups, 28 then
those agencies will attempt to block congressional attempts to reorganize them
into a more efficient, and more menacing, centralized department. If Congress
nonetheless succeeds in doing so, as it recently has, why cannot a future
Congress succeed in abolishing or curtailing the agency created to meet the
emergency? The dilemma for the statist ratchet account is that either
bureaucratic inertia is real, in which case it will block liberty-infringing moves
as well as liberty-expanding ones, or it is not real, in which case libertyinfringing moves will not become entrenched.

26. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a

Difference Sixtv Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 285-86 (2002); Arthur Krock,
When MartialLaw Was ProposedforEverybody, N.Y. TiMES, July 14, 1942, at 18.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2003).
28. For an example, see Tushnet, supra note 19, at 289.
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Generally speaking, there is no reason to suppose that laws, policies, and
bureaucratic institutions created during an emergency (1) systematically fail to
change, or change back, after a crisis has passed (2) because of institutional
inertia and interest group pressure. World War I produced a large new cadre of
regulatory agencies that persisted into the New Deal and beyond. 29 But a
plausible view is that the national economy was previously underregulated, and
that the new institutions satisfied social demand; so this example does not
clearly satisfy condition (2). The quasiwar with France in 1798 produced the
Alien and Sedition Acts, but the former expired in 1800 and the latter in
1801,30 in violation of condition (1); why did the statist ratchet not operate
there? A similar example involves Lincoln's notorious suspension of habeas
corpus-an action that was undone after the Civil War's end. 31 Why no statist
ratchet?
These examples are impressionistic but not more so than the examples
adduced by proponents of the statist ratchet. Indeed, preliminary empirical
work has now examined the ratchet thesis and finds that "contrary to
widespread fear and speculation that doctrine created during wartime 'lingers'
on in peacetime, the rights jurisprudence appears to 'bounce back' during
peacetime. '32 As we discuss at the end of this Part, the best working
presumption for constitutional law follows this finding. We should presume
that no ratchet effects operate, in any direction; institutional change displays no
consistent trend or mechanism and is determined differently in different
contexts by a complex mix of political, economic, and technological forces.
3. Psychologicalproblems:Adaptive preferences?

We will briefly look at the idea that the statist ratchet operates by virtue of
a psychological mechanism. Proponents of the statist ratchet account say, rather
vaguely, that government's emergency measures have "[a] tranquilizing effect
... on the general public's critical approach toward emergency regimes. '33 The
underlying picture here must be some sort of endogenous preference formation,
which causes social preferences to conform to government policies, or the
related idea of adaptive preferences, in which individuals limit their aspirations,
not merely their actions, by reference to the set of feasible policies. Somehow,
the intuition runs, society gets used to the postcrisis baseline of expanded
governmental power; the ratchet operates not because temporary emergency

29. Larry D. Kramer, But When Exactly Was Judicially Enforced Federalism "Born"
in the FirstPlace?, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 123, 132 (1998).
30. See Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the

Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 323 (1994).
31. For a discussion of Lincoln's constitutional legacy, see FARBER, supra note 6.
32. See Epstein et al., supra note 2, at 53.
33. Gross, supra note 1, at 1093-94.
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measures block society's capacity to return to the status quo ante, but because
society no longer desires to do so.
The implicit assumption here is that the postcrisis baseline is bad. If it is
good-if the precrisis baseline represented a society underprepared for
emergencies, in which law and institutions were supplying too much liberty and
not enough order-then the endogenous formation of preferences for the
postcrisis baseline would help to stabilize the new regime and would thus be
good as well. At the very least we would need a very strong account (welfarist
or nonwelfarist) of the value of autonomous preference formation to say that
the public's adaptation to the new social state is bad; the statist ratchet offers no
such account. So the preference-based version of the statist ratchet is, like the
institutional version, parasitic on a suppressed and wholly independent
judgment that the status quo ante represents the correct balance between liberty
and order; more on this below.
In fact, however, the evidence that endogenous or adaptive preference
formation operates in this way is scant indeed. As we also discuss below,
another view paints just the opposite picture of political and social psychology:
In the postcrisis state, a widespread revulsion against the prevailing libertyinfringing policies sets in, and society judges, in hindsight, that the emergency
measures were unnecessary. The stock example is the World War II era
internment of Japanese-American citizens, which is now widely described as an
egregious mistake that inflicted unnecessary deprivations of liberty, due in part
to racial animus. If this sort of post hoc revulsion operates consistently, then the
right account would emphasize contrarian preference formation and hindsight
bias, rather than the endogenous preference formation and confirmation bias
posited by the statist ratchet. But we will claim that a third account-no
ratchets operate systematically, in either a liberty-restricting or a libertyexpanding direction-is the most convincing of all.
4. Normativeproblems: Is the statist ratchet bad?

Normatively, the statist ratchet account simply assumes that the status quo
ante-the legal baseline prior to the emergency that produces an irreversible
expansion of state control-already embodies the optimal balance between
liberty and security. So the statist ratchet in effect makes two normative
assertions: (1) The precrisis legal rules were optimally balanced for the
precrisis state; and (2) the postcrisis rules are too restrictive for the postcrisis
state.
Yet in some settings either or both of these assertions will fail to hold. We
might deny (2) while affirming (1), if we think both that the precrisis rules were
optimal for the precrisis state and that the postcrisis rules are optimal for the
postcrisis state. If, for example, the crisis is the product of a permanent change
in the polity's political circumstances, such that the value of security is higher
after the crisis than before it, then the balance should be recalibrated after the
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crisis; failing to do so would constitute social paralysis, rather than a laudable
respect for traditional liberties.
More interestingly, we might deny both (1) and (2), if we think that before
the emergency society was, in some sense, unprepared for the emergency,
underregulated, or excessively liberty-protecting, while after the emergency
society has attained the optimal balance. We might believe, for example, that as
of September 10, 2001, American governmental institutions were supplying too
much liberty and not enough security. Well-documented turf battles between
uncoordinated, and arguably inefficient, security and intelligence agencies
meant that government failed to anticipate and forestall a major terrorist attack,
or even to plan sensibly for its aftermath. 34 On this sort of view, the
institutional puzzle would be to explain why government underreacted to the
terrorist threat-the opposite of the puzzle for the statist ratchet account, which
is to explain why government overreacts to threats. The point here is not to
endorse this view of post-9/11 security reorganization, on the merits. But the
possibility cannot be assumed away, a priori.
Proponents of the statist ratchet rarely consider these possibilities. Consider
Dermot Walsh's argument that the expansion of law enforcement powers in the
Republic of Ireland, from about 1970 to the present, has created a legal regime
in which official powers to investigate and detain both suspected terrorists and
ordinary criminals systematically trumps civil liberties. 35 Walsh's account
suggests that legal rules initially formulated to cope with terrorist campaigns
and other security emergencies bled over into ordinary policing, resulting in a
harsh regime of criminal procedure. Walsh disclaims any substantive
evaluation of these developments, confining himself to the procedural objection
that the developments never received adequate legislative deliberation. Oren
Gross, however, cites Walsh's history in an argument that emergency powers
of the sort initially granted to Irish officials will produce "insidious changes"
36
by spilling over into nonemergency settings.
But nothing in Walsh's history suggests any reason to condemn, on
substantive civil-libertarian grounds, the result of the developments he
describes. Walsh notes that the initial impetus for expanded law enforcement
authority was "[t]he escalation of subversive activity associated with Northern
Ireland" (although he tendentiously calls this a "pretext"), and acknowledges
that the preexisting law was "so heavily biased in favour of the freedom of the

34. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES,

COMBATING TERRORISM 10-17 (2001) (giving government preparedness a mixed reviewprepared before 9/11 and released afterwards-and also finding important failures of
accountability and of coordination, both among federal agencies and between the federal
government and the states).
35.

Dermot P.J. Walsh, The Impact of the Antisubversive Laws on Police Powers and

Practices in Ireland: The Silent Erosion of Individual Freedom, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1099,
1102 (1989).
36. Gross, supra note 1, at 1072.
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individual that the task facing the prosecution could be described fairly as a
very tricky obstacle course."'37 So an obvious alternative view is that in Ireland,
circa 1970, the law of criminal procedure was too lax for an increasingly
complex and heterogeneous society-perhaps because the relevant law was
initially impressed with the libertarian mold of nineteenth-century British
procedure and had never been updated. The expansion of police powers after
1970, on this view, would just represent a belated adjustment towards the
optimum balance of liberty and security, not a lamentable departure from that
balance.
In like vein, Gross says that, "emergencies have led to quantum leaps" in a
process of "aggrandizement" of executive powers in America, France, and
Great Britain after the two world wars. 38 Aggrandizement is meant to sound
bad, but Gross never actually gives a straightforward normative argument to
that effect. It is equally possible that quantum leaps occurred because war or
emergency liberated the polity from some institutional sclerosis, or entrenched
equilibrium, that had held government power at an inadequately low level.
Gross acknowledges that "[t]he growing complexity of modern society and the
needs of its members have played an important role in the expansion of
executive authority"; 39 but this may be the whole story, not just part of it.
Why, exactly, is it bad if emergency or temporary measures spill over into
the ordinary legal system? Spillover of this sort is, in itself, neither good nor
bad. The only question is whether the new state of affairs is an improvement on
the status quo ante or not; if it is an improvement, then the spillover was a
benign event. Perhaps the war or emergency stimulated legal experimentation,
spurred the development of new technology or produced ingenious policy
mechanisms; in any of these cases it might be wise, not foolish, to incorporate
the new information or innovation into the ordinary law after the emergency
has passed. The statist ratchet suffers from a virulent strain of the naturalistic
fallacy: Whatever complex of legal rules happens to exist, at some status quo
point, is taken to be good, and any shift in the direction of greater security is
taken to be bad. But if the status quo can embody too much liberty, rather than
just the right amount, that picture is arbitrary.
C. The LibertarianRatchet

If the statist ratchet identifies a sustained and irreversible decline of civil
liberties, a mirror-image position-the libertarian ratchet-identifies a
progressive and optimistic trend. In this camp are Chief Justice Rehnquist's
claim to discern a "generally ameliorative trend" in government's treatment of

37. Walsh, supra note 35, at 1128-29.
38. Gross, supra note 1, at 1095-96.
39. Id. at 1095.
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civil liberties during wartime; 40 an argument by Jack Goldsmith and Cass
Sunstein that social evaluation, in hindsight, of government performance during
wars and other crises produces a "trend toward greater protection for civil
liberties in wartime"; 4 1 and a similar argument by Mark Tushnet. 42 Of these,
Rehnquist and Tushnet seem to view the libertarian ratchet as good, while
Goldsmith and Sunstein focus on explanation rather than normative assessment.
Many of the preceding objections to the statist ratchet apply equally against the
libertarian ratchet, mutatis mutandis; we will confine ourselves to a few
additional points.
The first is that the libertarian ratchet, like the statist ratchet, extrapolates a
trend from an impoverished data set containing too few observations.
Proponents of the libertarian ratchet have little to work with: the Civil War,
World Wars I and II, the armed conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and perhaps
the "red scares" of the 1950s if "war" is defined capaciously. Many curves can
be drawn through such a small set of points.
Goldsmith and Sunstein claim that: "compared to past wars led by Lincoln,
Wilson, and Roosevelt, the Bush administration has, thus far, diminished
relatively few civil liberties. Even a conservative Executive branch, it seems, is
influenced by the general trend towards protections of civil liberty during
wartime." 4 3 Although the first point is indisputable-the Bush administration
has not suspended the writ of habeas corpus, punished harmless dissenters, or
interned large numbers of American citizens-the second point does not follow
from the first and is methodologically infirm. To know whether the Bush
administration would behave with greater respect for civil liberties than the
administrations of Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt, we would have to observe
similar conditions, and we do not. Would the Bush administration show as
much restraint if enemy troops were within a short train ride of Washington
(Lincoln), if Europe exploded in armed struggle (Wilson), or if an American
fleet had been wiped out by the surprise attack of a foreign state (Roosevelt)? It
is not hard to imagine, even today, that civil liberties would be extensively
abridged in such circumstances. These are counterfactual speculations, but the
libertarian ratchet itself rests on a counterfactual speculation-that current
administrations would behave with more restraint than past ones, given like
conditions.
The general claim is that a series of wars 44 produce an ever-greater respect

40. REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 221.
41. Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 262.
42. Tushnet, supra note 19, at 294-95.

43. Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 288.
44. Or, at least, successful wars. Goldsmith and Sunstein say that "there is nothing
inevitable" about the ratchet effect they identify; it is a product of America's "remarkable
record of military success ....
Id. at 285. (But what about the War of 1812, Pearl Harbor,
and the Vietnam War?) In this sense, Goldsmith and Sunstein suggest that the libertarian
ratchet is contingent--"an accident of America's distinctive history." Id. at 262. If this
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for civil liberties, but it is hardly obvious that the independent variable and the
dependent one are correlated, let alone causally linked. In many countries,
casual empiricism suggests that a series of wars and crises have not produced
ever-increasing respect for civil liberties; consider the history of Prussia, and
Germany as a whole, between 1871 and 1945. And in other countries civil
liberties have increased over time periods when no wars occurred; Europe after
World War 1I is a large example. In the European case, and in other cases,
national wealth is a major confounding variable, one that Goldsmith and
Sunstein say little about. A plausible hypothesis is that wealthier countries,
whatever their military history, show greater respect for civil liberties than
45
poorer ones do.

To establish the libertarian ratchet, a much larger comparative study would
be necessary; confining the inquiry to one nation (America) and a few wars
tells us little. This is so even if there has been a constantly increasing respect
for civil liberties in America. To generate the general claim solely from the
American case is to commit the methodological mistake of selecting cases on
the dependent variable. 46 The claim that spring will come early whenever the
groundhog sees his shadow cannot be proved by looking solely at years in
which, in fact, spring came early.
Perhaps we should understand the libertarian ratchet not as advancing a
fully specified hypothesis of this sort but simply as describing a causal
mechanism that operates ceteris paribus: After a series of wars, hindsight tends
to produce social judgments that past suspensions of civil liberties were
unnecessary. But our second point is that the hindsight-bias mechanism is
underspecified; the level of generality at which hindsight operates makes a
critical difference. Goldsmith and Sunstein seem to assume that the hindsight
judgment operates to bar "unnecessary" future invasions of civil liberties, as a
general class, 47 but it may equally be true that hindsight condemns only the
specific policies or programs instituted in past crises. New policies or programs
will be categorized differently in the social cognition and will be assessed
strictly ex ante. As Tushnet puts it (in acknowledged tension with his own
argument):
means that the ratchet need never have occurred, it is unexceptionable. If it means that,
having occurred, the trend of increasing respect for civil liberties would be reversed by
future military defeats, then the qualification undermines Goldsmith and Sunstein's claim to
having identified a ratchet effect in the first place. As explained in this text, irreversibility is
the sine qua non of any ratchet account.

45. For discussions of the evidence, see Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of
Human Rights to PersonalIntegrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCl. REV.

853 (1994); Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate & Linda Camp Keith, Repression of the Human
Right to PersonalIntegrity Revisited.- A Global Cross-NationalStudy Covering the Years
1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 291 (1999).
46.

GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:

SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE INQUALITATIVE RESEARCH 129 (1994).

47. Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 262.
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Judges and scholars develop doctrines and approaches that preclude the
repetition of the last generation's mistakes. Unfortunately, each new threat
generates new policy responses, which are-almost by definition-not
precluded by the doctrines designed to make it impossible to adopt the policies
used last time. And yet, the next generation again concludes that the new
policy responses were mistaken. We learn from our mistakes to the extent that
we do not repeat precisely the same errors, but it seems that we do not learn
48
enough to keep us from making new and different mistakes.

This is a version of the conceptual point we advanced against the statist
ratchet: Because the policy space changes over time, it is simplistic to ask
whether wars or other emergencies cause an "increase" or "decrease" in
governmental respect for civil liberties. As old forms of governmental control
become disreputable and disappear (suspension of judicial process, suppression
of political speech, and internment), new forms become technologically
feasible and normatively freighted (consider sophisticated government
monitoring of private communications, including Internet use, or of lawyers'
conversations with clients). Here again, there just is no single dimension of
greater or lesser respect for civil liberties-and thus no predicate for the
unidirectional trend line that both the libertarian and statist ratchets assume,
albeit in different directions.
D. Government Without Ratchets
The last point emphasizes the common premise of the libertarian and statist
ratchets: Both accounts assume that the history of civil liberties in America
shows a constant trend, or at least that war and other emergencies have a
constant, unidirectional ratchet effect on civil liberties. The two accounts
simply disagree about the direction of the trend.
We favor a third view: There just are no systematic trends in the history of
civil liberties, no important ratchet-like mechanisms that cause repeated wars or
emergencies to push civil liberties in one direction or another in any sustained
fashion. Wars, crises, and emergencies come in a range of shapes and sizes; the
categories themselves are just methodological conveniences, dichotomous cuts
in continuous phenomena. It is unclear, given the current state of the empirical
work, whether wars and emergencies have any effect on civil liberties; if they
do, the effects may be complex and multiple, not simple and unidirectional.
Especially absent is any convincing reason to think that any political, social, or
psychological ratchet, under which wars and emergencies have irreversible
effects on future policies, operates. The best available empirical work finds no
ratchet effects, in either direction, 4 9 and the mechanisms said to create a ratchet
are implausible or underspecified.

48. Tushnet, supra note 19, at 292.
49. See Epstein et al., supra note 2, at 53-54; see also POSNER, supra note 2, at 304.
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As a working presumption, then, we should approach each new social
state-whether labeled war, emergency, or anything else-without worrying or
hoping that our present choices will have systematic and irreversible effects on
the choices made by future generations in unforeseeable future emergencies.
The better question is just whether, given the circumstances as we know them
to be at present, the policies that government pursues are good ones, in light of
whatever substantive theory of rights we hold, and in light of the costs and
benefits of alternative courses of action. This formulation is deliberately banal.
What it rejects is any attempt to structure the inquiry into the merits of
particular policies by worrying about the precedential effects of current
policies, or in some other way speculating on the irreversible system-level
effects of those policies, over time, on future emergencies that future versions
of our own society will face. That additional question is a strange attempt, as it
were, to get beyond or outside our own historical circumstances; and there is no
reason to think that there are any such effects anyway.
III. FEAR
In this Part we criticize accounts of emergency that emphasize the
Constitution's role in limiting the impact of fear on government policy. The
panic thesis argues that because fear causes decisionmakers to exaggerate
threats and neglect civil liberties and similar values, expanding decisionmakers'
constitutional powers will result in bad policy. Any gains to national security
would be minimal, and the losses to civil liberties would be great. Thus,
enforcing the Constitution to the same extent as during periods of normalcy
would protect civil liberties at little cost.
We argue that the panic thesis is wrong and does not support the strict
enforcement position. We make three points. First, fear does not play an
unambiguously negative role in decisionmaking. Against the standard view that
fear interferes with decisionmaking, we argue that fear has both cognitive and
motivational benefits. Second, even if fear did play a negative role, it is
doubtful that fear, so understood, has much influence on policy during
emergencies or that it has more influence on policy during emergencies than it
does during normal times. Third, even if fear did play a negative role in
decisionmaking and played a greater role during emergencies than during
normal times, it is doubtful that these bad effects can be avoided through the
enforcement of the Constitution or other institutional devices, at acceptable cost
to national security. All three of these points suggest that strict enforcement of
the Constitution during emergencies will not improve policy choices by
restricting the influence of fear.
A. Preliminaries

Fear can influence government action in two ways. First, government
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officials might feel fear. Second, even if government officials do not feel fear,
the public might feel fear, and government officials might feel compelled to act
on the public's fears, lest they be turned out of office for being insufficiently
responsive to the public's concerns. In the second case, it is a useful
simplification to assume that government officials, by acting as honest agents,
act as if they were themselves afraid; thus, the two cases can be treated as
though they were the same. In Part III.E, we consider the case where only the
public feels fear and government officials are insulated from popular pressure.
To understand how fearful government officials might make decisions, one
can profitably begin by considering the rational actor model as a baseline. The
rational actor model assumes that people implicitly use accurate probability
distributions to estimate the likelihood of uncertain outcomes. The
methodological assumption is obviously strong; the justification is that errors
are symmetrical and wash out, so that aggregate behavior obeys accurate
probability distributions at a statistically significant level even if individual
behavior deviates in both directions. If this assumption is true, then
governments act as rationally during emergencies as during normal times. The
decision to infringe civil liberties for security purposes may be right or wrong,
but it is no more likely right or wrong than the quotidian decision to construct a
highway or reduce funding for education. There is no reason to think that the
government will systematically undervalue civil liberties or overvalue security
during emergencies or that it will systematically overestimate the magnitude of
a threat, compared to its behavior during nonemergencies. Instead, the
government will attach the same weights to these goods as it does during
normal times; it will also on average accurately estimate the magnitude of the
threat.
The rational actor model does not clearly support either the
accommodation position or the strict enforcement position. The critic of
accommodation can argue that a rational executive will disregard civil liberties
the same during emergencies as during normal times; therefore, constitutional
enforcement should be the same as well. Courts can protect civil liberties while
permitting emergency measures by requiring that the government show that
infringements on civil liberties serve the compelling interest in national
security. The defense of accommodation rests not on the rational actor model
but on an empirical assumption about relative institutional competence: Courts
are in a bad position to evaluate the executive's emergency measures. Secrecy
is more important than during normal times-so are speed, vigor, and
enthusiasm. The characteristics of judicial review-deliberation, openness,
independence, distance, slowness-may be minor costs, and sometimes virtues,
during normal times; but during emergencies they can be intolerable.
The panic thesis argues that the problem with emergency measures is not
that they may be rational but objectionable infringements on civil liberties but
that they are frequently irrational and thus infringe civil liberties without also
creating sufficient national security benefits. During emergencies, panic
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interferes with rational assessment of risks. The distortion can take a number of
forms: exaggeration of the probability or magnitude of the threatened harm, or,
what amounts to nearly the same thing, neglect of competing values such as
privacy and equality. As a result, government interests will not usually be as
compelling as everyone thinks they are, and government policy, if not
constrained, will unnecessarily interfere with civil liberties. Although this
argument is conventionally advanced by civil libertarians concerned by
wartime restrictions, it also underlies a popular view about the effectiveness of
terrorism: that it "trap[s] the authorities into brutal repression and overreaction
which then alienates the public and drives them into tacit or active
collaboration with the terrorists."' 50 The claim is not that the government
rationally curtails civil liberties in order to combat the terrorist threat, but that
the government overreacts, and that the public tolerates a rational response but
not an overreaction. The source of overreaction could only be fear or some
other emotion such as anger or outrage. 5 1 On this view, strict enforcement of
the Constitution has two virtues: preservation of civil liberties, a good in itself,
and preservation of the government against its own bad judgment.
This argument, at base, holds that the government's policy will not reflect
accurate probability distributions or else that a rational government will take
advantage of the public's inaccurate probability distributions so that it can
accomplish ends denied to it during normal times. Fear displaces rational
assessment of the risks at one level or the other.
B. Two Views of Fear
The strict enforcement view depends heavily on a particular theory of fear,
a theory that implies that fear interferes with cognition and judgment. However,
fear is a complex phenomenon, and generalizing about its relationship to
cognition is hazardous.
Fear is in part a purely physiological response to a threat, a response that is

50. PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE 81 (1977) (discussing the
ideas of Carlos Marighela).
51. Parenthetically, we find this view, which has made its way into the legal literature

(see Cole, supra note 8; Oren Gross, Cutting Down Trees: Law-Making Under the Shadow
of Great Calamities,in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM

BILL 39, 43 (Ronald J.Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach eds., 2001)) unconvincing.
It might be an ancillary benefit for terrorists that the government's repressive tactics make it
unpopular. But in the normal course of things the government will choose appropriate
measures, and the public will blame the terrorists for the government's repression. Terrorist
tactics reflect the methods that are available, and terrorists succeed or not in obtaining public
support to the extent that the public prefers the terrorists' goals to the government's. Liberals
who object to their own government's use of repressive tactics are hardly likely to switch
their allegiance to the terrorists who deliberately provoked them. For a more measured
discussion, see CLIVE WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW 1-3 (1986).
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outside of conscious control. 52 When a person comes upon a tiger in a jungle,
he undergoes certain physiological changes-the chemistry of his blood
changes, his heartbeat increases, certain areas of his brain are stimulated-that
result in an urge to flee that can be overcome only with difficulty. One
interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that panic responses appear to be
asymmetrically distributed: False positives are more likely than false negatives.
A person is more likely to flee from a shadow that looks like a tiger than to fail
to run from a tiger that looks like a shadow. 53 Evolutionary psychologists argue
that the asymmetry of responses is the result of an asymmetry in the payoffs. A
person who is devoured by a tiger is worse off than a person who unnecessarily
runs away from a shadow. Thus, the noncognitive aspect of fear has two
immediate implications: that people do not think about threats and react to them
"rationally"; and that the automatic reaction to threats reflects long gone
evolutionary pressures rather than the needs of an agent in modem society.
This story yields two opposing approaches to the role of fear in
decisionmaking. The first, simple view is that fear interferes with cognition:
The person who feels fear reacts to the threat instinctively rather than
deliberatively and in a way that is biased rather than neutral. Fear of air travel
causes people to drive, which is riskier; fear of pesticides, toxic waste, and
genetic engineering causes people to endorse expensive and ineffective policies
that cause more harm than good. 54 This fear-interferes-with-cognition view has
deep roots in the Western philosophical tradition, a long-running theme of
which is the opposition of reason and passion. 55 Passions interfere with reason,

52. For a survey of the psychology literature on fear, see Ame Ohman, Fear and
Anxiety as Emotional Phenomena: Clinical Phenomenology, Evolutionary Perspectives, and
Information-ProcessingMechanisms, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 520 (Michael Lewis &

Jeannette M. Haviland eds., 1993); for discussions of the psychology literature on emotion
and its relation to legal regulation, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the
Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (2002) (criticizing legal scholars for
misunderstanding emotion); Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
211 (2002) (discussing the role of hatred in law and policy); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Concepts of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996)
(contrasting the influence of cognitive and noncognitive theories of emotion in criminal
law); Eric A. Posner, Fear and the Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism,25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 681 (2002) (discussing how counterterrorism policy can respond to fear); Eric A.
Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977 (2001) (discussing the role of emotion in
legal theory) [hereinafter Posner, Law and the Emotions]. There is not much other work on
this relationship. Kuran and Sunstein's examination of the legal response to environmental
panics, for example, treats these panics as though they were purely cognitive phenomena.
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683 (1999). For criticisms of this approach, see Rachel F. Moran, Fear Unbound. A
Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1-8, 27-28 (2002); Posner, Law and the
Emotions, supra,at 2002-06.
53. Ohman, supra note 52, at 520.
54. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 52, at 698, 700-03, 742.
55. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (20th anniversary ed. 1997).
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and the rational person attempts to suppress them. When a person is motivated
by passion, it means that his choices are unlikely to be good ones.
The second view is that fear does not interfere with cognition, or if it does,
the interference contributes to good action. 56 There are two related points here.
First, fear enhances the senses: The person who feels fear is attuned to the
threat and alert to every nuance of the environment. Fear powers a searchlight
that highlights some features of the landscape even as it obscures others.
Second, fear provides motivation. Where a fully rational person spends time
deliberating, the fearful person acts quickly. Both of these factors suggest that
fear can play a constructive role during national emergencies.
How does fear enhance the senses? Although the fearful person may make
the characteristic mistake of seeing a tiger in a shadow, the other side of this
error is the sensory arousal that allows the person to pick out in the
environment threats that would otherwise be invisible. It has been said that
after 9/11, airplane passengers and security officials paid much more attention
to other passengers and were more ready to alert authorities or intervene
personally if they saw something suspicious. This alertness resulted in many
false positives: Conversations were misinterpreted, conclusions were drawn
from swarthy complexions, and harmless objects were confiscated as weapons.
But in a few cases, hijackings or bombings were, or may have been, prevented.
Do the lives saved justify the inconvenience to all passengers and Arabs and
Muslims in particular? Civil libertarians might say yes or no, but one's position
on this question is not the issue. What recent experience has shown is that fear
has generated cognitive gains as well as losses, and part of the reason is that the
asymmetry between gains and losses that underlie the evolutionary story may
apply to a world threatened by terrorism as well, however imperfectly. The
simple story-that fear means error-is too simple.
The motivational benefit of fear for individuals is that it enables a rapid
response to a possible threat that, if real, would not give individuals time to
deliberate about available options. To the drafter of a rule that constrains the
curtailment of civil liberties, or to the judge who seeks to enforce that rule or
the general strict enforcement position, the decisionmaker always has a
powerful argument:
Your rational assessments-even if they are not clouded by your remoteness
from the current emergency-may have resulted from a kind of clear thinking
but are fatally compromised by your motivational remoteness. If you did not
feel fear, then you cannot have put in the necessary effort to make the right
decision.
Fear compels people to devote resources to solving a problem that for a
dispassionate and uninvolved person may be interesting but is not compelling.
In this way, fear motivates not only action but deliberation. Having perceived a

56. See ANTHONY R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES'

ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE

HUMAN BRAIN (1994); RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION (1987).
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threat, and felt fear, people will work hard to think of ways to address it. They
are more likely to discard old assumptions and complacent ways of thinking,
and to address problems with new vigor.
The second, complex view of fear does not deny the insights of the first
view; it incorporates them into a more nuanced account. Fear will produce
choices that are different from those that will be made by a person who does
not feel fear, but these choices may be better or worse, depending on context.
The argument here mirrors an increasingly influential psychological and
philosophical literature on the passions, a literature that stresses the
constructive role of the passions in judgment. 57 "Emotions provide the animal
[including the human] with a sense of how the world relates to its own set of
goals and projects. Without that sense, decisionmaking and action are
derailed."'58 Disgust involves a form of magical thinking that causes people to
avoid objects or persons who are harmless; but it also reflects moral judgments
and motivates condemnation of morally offensive behavior. 59 Anger can
magnify slights and provoke violence; but it is also a response to an offense
against one's dignity and can motivate legitimate protest. 60 The passions do not
always inhibit reason; they also inform reason and provide the motivation for
necessary action.
Against the view that panicked government officials overreact to an
emergency and unnecessarily curtail civil liberties, we suggest a more
constructive theory of the role of fear. Before the emergency, government
officials are complacent. They do not think clearly or vigorously about the
potential threats faced by the nation. After the terrorist attack or military
intervention, their complacency is replaced by fear. Fear stimulates them to
action. Action may be based on good decisions or bad: Fear might cause
officials to exaggerate future threats, but it also might arouse them to threats
that they would otherwise not perceive. It is impossible to say in the abstract
whether decisions and actions provoked by fear are likely to be better than
decisions and actions made in a state of calm. But our limited point is that there
is no reason to think that the fear-inspired decisions are likely to be worse. For
that reason, the existence of fear during emergencies does not support the strict
enforcement theory that the Constitution should be enforced as strictly during
emergencies as during normal times.
C. The Influence ofFearDuringEmergencies

Suppose now that the simple view of fear is correct and that it is an
unambiguously negative influence on government decisionmaking. Critics of
57. See, e.g., DAMASIO, supra note 56.
58. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT 117 (2001).
59. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997).

60. NUSSBAUM, supra note 58, at 394.
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accommodation argue that this negative influence of fear justifies both
skepticism about emergency policies and strict enforcement of the Constitution.
However, this argument is implausible. It is doubtful that fear, so understood,
has more influence on decisionmaking during emergencies than on
decisionmaking during normal times.
The panic thesis holds that citizens and officials respond to terrorism and
war in the same way that an individual in the jungle responds to a tiger or
snake. The national response to emergency, because it is a standard fear
response, is characterized by the same circumvention of ordinary deliberative
processes: Thus, (1) the response is instinctive rather than reasoned, and thus
subject to error; and (2) the error will be biased in the direction of overreaction.
While the flight reaction was a good evolutionary strategy on the savannah, in a
complex modem society the flight response is not suitable and can only
interfere with judgment. Its advantage-speed-has minimal value for social
decisionmaking. No national emergency requires an immediate reactionexcept by trained professionals who execute policies established earlier-but
instead over days, months, or years people make complex judgments about the
appropriate institutional response. And the asymmetrical nature of fear
guarantees that people will, during a national emergency, overweigh the threat
and underweigh other things that people value, such as civil liberties.
But if decisionmakers rarely act immediately, then the tiger story cannot
bear the metaphoric weight that is placed on it. Indeed, the flight response has
nothing to do with the political response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the
attack on September 11. The people who were there-the citizens and soldiers
beneath the bombs, the office workers in the World Trade Center-no doubt
felt fear, and most of them probably responded in the classic way. They
experienced the standard physiological effects, and (with the exception of
trained soldiers and security officials) fled without stopping to think. It is also
true that in the days and weeks after the attacks, many people felt fear, although
not the sort that produces an irresistible urge to flee. But this kind of fear is not
the kind in which cognition shuts down. Some people did have more severe
mental reactions and, for example, shut themselves in their houses, but these
reactions were rare. The fear is probably better described as a general anxiety
or jumpiness, an anxiety that was probably shared by government officials as
61
well as ordinary citizens.
While, as we have noted, there is psychological research suggesting that
normal cognition partly shuts down in response to an immediate threat, we are
aware of no research suggesting that people who feel anxious about a non-

61. Moran argues that psychologists distinguish these phenomena. See Moran, supra
note 52, at 10-11. Ohman, however, does not distinguish these phenomena. See Ohman,
supra note 52. One might distinguish the classic flight response associated with fear and say
that an anxious person is primed to have that response. But the special cognitive and
motivational characteristics of fear seem to carry over to the analysis of anxiety.
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immediate threat are incapable of thinking, or thinking properly, or
systematically overweigh the threat relative to other values. Indeed, it would be
surprising to find research that clearly distinguished "anxious thinking" and
"calm thinking," given that anxiety is a pervasive aspect of life. People are
anxious about their children, about their health, about their job prospects,about
their vacation arrangements, about walking home at night. No one argues that
people's anxiety about their health causes them to take too many precautionsto get too much exercise, to diet too aggressively, to go to the doctor too
frequently-and to undervalue other things like leisure. So it is hard to see why
anxiety about more remote threats, from terrorists or unfriendly countries with
nuclear weapons, should cause the public, or elected officials, to place more
emphasis on security than is justified and to sacrifice civil liberties
unnecessarily.
Fear generated by immediate threats, then, causes instinctive responses that
are not rational in the cognitive sense, not always desirable, and not a good
basis for public policy, but it is not this kind of fear that leads to restrictions of
civil liberties during wartime. The internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II may have been due to racial animus or to a mistaken assessment
of the risks; it was not the direct result of panic; indeed there was a delay of
weeks before the policy was seriously considered. 62 The civil libertarians'
argument that fear produces bad policy trades on the ambiguity of the word
"panic," which refers both to real fear that undermines rationality and to
collectively harmful outcomes that are driven by rational decisions, such as a
bank panic, where it is rational for all depositors to withdraw funds if they
believe that enough other depositors are withdrawing funds. Once we eliminate
the false concern about fear, it becomes clear that the panic thesis is
indistinguishable from the argument that during an emergency people are likely
to make mistakes. But if the only concern is that during emergencies people
make mistakes, there would be no reason for demanding that the Constitution
be enforced normally during emergencies. Political errors occur during
emergencies and during normal times, but the stakes are higher during
emergencies and that is the conventional reason why constitutional constraints
should be relaxed.
In sum, the panic thesis envisions decisionmakers acting immediately when
in fact government policymaking moves slowly even during emergencies.
Government is organized so that general policy decisions about responses to
emergencies are made in advance, and the implementation of policy during an
emergency is trusted to security officials who have been trained to resist the
impulse to panic. The notion of fear causing an irresistible urge to flee is a bad
metaphor for an undeniable truth: that during an emergency the government
does not have as much time as it usually does and as a result will make more

62.

GREG ROBINSON, By ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT:

FDR

AND THE INTERNMENT OF

JAPANESE AMERICANS 75 (2001).
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errors than it usually does. But these errors will be driven by ordinary cognitive
limitations and not the pressure of fear: Thus, the errors will be normally
distributed. It is as likely that the government will curtail civil liberties too little
as too much.
D. A Note on Cognitive Panics
It is possible that civil libertarians' worry about the influence of fear is not
based on any assumption about emotions per se but is based on concerns about
cognition. Their theory might be that during emergencies, individuals, whether
as voters or as decisionmakers, are more likely to make cognitive errors than
during normal times. Something about emergencies causes cognition to falter.
This view, by itself, would not justify strict enforcement. If individuals make
more errors during emergencies than during normal times, they are just as
likely to err in favor of too much liberty as to err in favor of too much security.
Strict enforcement would, by reducing only the errors in favor of security,
create an overall policy bias against security. Strict enforcement would be
justified only if errors are biased in favor of security in the first place.
Clearly, this is what civil libertarians must think. People worry that after a
terrorist attack the public will overreact and demand unnecessary restrictions on
civil liberties. No one seems to worry that after abuses by the police come to
light the public will overreact and demand unnecessary restrictions on policing.
But no one has explained why cognitive error would be biased against civil
liberties in this way. The public cares about national security and civil liberties;
why should its errors be biased against only the latter?
An instructive analogy is Kuran and Sunstein's argument that
environmental disasters distort regulation because of their "availability."
Because environmental disasters are salient, they engage the availability
heuristic, which causes people to overestimate the probability of recurrence and
demand regulation that is not cost-justified. 63 Unfortunately, the evidence for
this argument is only anecdotal. We know that many environmental regulations
are not cost-justified, but we do not have enough data to subject the
Kuran/Sunstein hypothesis to a statistical test.
But even if Kuran and Sunstein are correct about environmental regulation,
there is an important difference between environmental regulation and security
policy. If environmental disasters are salient, the cost from overregulationlost consumer surplus resulting from inflated production costs--does not have
salience. This asymmetry in the availability of the costs of underregulation and
overregulation could result in overregulation, as Kuran and Sunstein argue. By
contrast, government violation of civil liberties-mass internments, torture, and
so forth-are just as salient as the terrorist attacks that provoke them. The

63. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 52.
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availability heuristic therefore can work its ill effects on both sides of the
problem: Terrorist attacks cause people to overestimate the probability of
further terrorist attacks, but civil rights violations also cause people to
overestimate the probability of further civil rights violations. Strict enforcement
would prevent the first error from leading to overregulation, but it would not
prevent the second error from leading to underregulation. Therefore, strict
enforcement would bias policy against security.
One might argue that this balancing of availability problems has an air of
unreality. The real problem here is that the availability heuristic is poorly
understood. No one knows what makes one event psychologically salient and
another event psychologically inert, and for that reason it is hard to talk
productively about the extent to which availability on one side of an issue can
cancel the effects of availability on the other side of the issue. We agree; but
this just shows that the availability heuristic provides a flimsy basis for
departing from the accommodation view, which assumes that errors occur but
are unbiased.
E. InstitutionalProblems

Having registered our skepticism that citizens and officials are less capable
of judgment during emergencies than during normal times, we now consider
the panic thesis on its own terms, and assume for the sake of argument that
people predictably panic during national emergencies while remaining calm at
other times and that the panic has unambiguously negative consequences for
decisionmaking. Recall the panic thesis-that because of the danger of panic,
constitutional constraints should not be relaxed during emergencies. Higher
stakes do not justify relaxation of constitutional constraints because with the
higher stakes comes the danger of panic, and constitutional constraints are
needed to prevent fear from generating bad political outcomes such as
unnecessary restriction of civil liberties.
We now examine the question how those constitutional constraints could
be enforced. The strict enforcement view-that the Constitution be enforced as
strictly during an emergency as during a nonemergency---depends on citizens,
executive officials, or judges having the ability to enforce the Constitution
strictly despite their own fear-addled judgment that a policy is justified by a
threat to security. Is this assumption realistic? How can a person bind himself
against his own bad judgment? We examine three mechanisms: (1)
intrapersonal self-restraint; (2) reliance on rules; and (3) insulation of
decisionmakers. Each mechanism reflects a different tradeoff between
discretion, which results in cognitive errors, and constraint, which prevents
needed action. None provides reason for endorsing the panic thesis.
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1. Intrapersonalself-restraint.
The panic theory, which assumes that fearful officials make worse
judgments than calm officials, is not the same as the strict enforcement view.
The panic theory is just one rationale; the ratchet theory, as we saw, is another.
Indeed, the panic theory is broader than the strict enforcement view: It holds
that officials in a state of fear should always discount their own risk
assessments, whereas the strict enforcement view refers to one particular
circumstance, that of emergency. We might therefore ask, if the panic
justification for the strict enforcement view is correct, why not constrain policy
choices whenever officials are panicked, not just when there is an emergency;
and give calm officials free rein, even if there is an emergency? Officials could
be made to understand that whenever they feel fear, they are likely to discount
civil liberties and exaggerate the threat. 64 When they know themselves to be
afraid, they should engage in a kind of intrapersonal overcompensation and
assume that their own estimate of the threat is too high. Having pushed down a
risk assessment that they know to be high, they can make a rational decision
even when afraid.
This "panic rule," as we will call it--discount your own estimate of a threat
if you feel fear--captures the panic theory more precisely than the strict
enforcement view does. The panic rule is, in legal parlance, a standard: Its
contours are those of the underlying normative goal-that of preventing fear
from interfering with decisionmaking. Thus, the panic rule tells officials to
discount their risk assessments if and only if they feel fear. The strict
enforcement position is a rule: It tells officials to discount their risk
assessments if and only if there is an emergency. The fact of emergency serves
as a proxy for the normative concern, that of fear.
The benefit of the panic rule is that it allows the Constitution to
accommodate calm officials and requires strict enforcement only against those
who panic. The problem is its psychological unrealism. To see this problem,
suppose that third party enforcement of the Constitution is not feasible: The
officials who determine policy or law in a state of fear are the same as the
officials charged with enforcing or respecting the Constitution. Executives who
know that judges will defer to their foreign policy are nonetheless expected to
obey the Constitution. And judges themselves may feel fear to the same degree
as the decisionmakers whose laws are being reviewed in court. The panic rule
asks these officials to discount their own threat assessments whenever they feel

64. An intrapersonal analogy can be found in a favored technique of anger
management: When one feels angry, one should take a deep breath and count to ten before
acting. If one trains oneself to respond in a Pavlovian fashion to an event or condition, and
the response is likely to restore or improve judgment, then anger-inspired actions can be
avoided. Note, however, that this outcome is achieved through the use of a technique by
which one's judgment can return to normal; no one thinks that fear can go away after a deep
breath.

HeinOnline -- 56 Stan. L. Rev. 636 2003-2004

December 2003]

A CCOMMODA TING EMERGENCIES

fear.
The problem with this rule is that it assumes that decisionmakers can
accurately determine the conditions under which they should not trust their own
judgment. Suppose that some event such as a terrorist attack occurs, and then
the question facing decisionmakers is whether to use ethnic profiling in order to
prevent further attacks. If, as we must assume, the decisionmakers are afraid,
then they will overestimate the probability of another terrorist attack, and thus
be more likely to infringe civil liberties than they would if they were calm.
Self-restraint could occur only if decisionmakers could also realize that they
overestimate the risk because they are afraid. But this is psychologically
unrealistic: Either decisionmakers are afraid and exaggerate the risk, or are not
65
afraid and assess the risk accurately or with normal, unbiased error.
The contrary view would have one think that officials could both believe
that a threat exists and, knowing that they are afraid, doubt their own belief.
But if officials take the existence of fear as an indication that they should
discount their own beliefs, then why should they credit the belief that there is a
threat in the first place? 66 People feel fear because they perceive a threat; they
cannot step outside of themselves and doubt their own beliefs because they
know that fear can interfere with cognition.
2. Rules.

The psychological unrealism of the panic rule might be avoided through
the use of a more rule-like rule, one that does not require a decisionmaker to
hold incompatible beliefs. People have foresight and can design rules and
institutions that will dampen the influence of panic on political outcomes.
People might be able to design a rule that provides that when some event
associated with a panic occurs, decisionmakers should be cautious about
passing laws or engaging in other political actions. The mechanism involves a
distinction between the identification of conditions that can be accurately
perceived and acted upon even when the subject is emotionally aroused and the
exercise of judgment that the emotional state precludes. People would, even in
their fear-clouded minds, realize that they are afraid because a significant event
has occurred and thus that they should discount their own judgments or at least

65. We have not found in the psychology literature any studies on whether fearful
individuals can mentally compensate for biases introduced into their judgment by their own
fear. The cognitive psychology literature suggests that individuals can avoid the effect of
their own cognitive biases or their reliance on misleading heuristics in limited cases: For
example, their judgments can improve through unbiased feedback and they can choose to
rely on outside experts. However, there are severe cognitive and motivational impediments
to learning. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The UncertainPsychological Casefor Paternalism,97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1211-24 (2003).
66. Cf Thomas Schelling, Epilogue: Rationally Coping with Lapses from Rationality,

in GETTING HOOKED:

RATIONALITY AND ADDICTION

(Jon Elster & Ole-Jorgen eds., 1999).
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delay acting on them.
The condition or proxy could be an emergency described in relatively clear
terms: an invasion or attack by foreign soldiers, a natural disaster, a spike in the
death rate, a decline in the GDP. When these events occur, people could-in a
Pavlovian fashion?-feel themselves committed to discounting their own
assessments of risk. The rule might say that after a terrorist attack, one should
divide one's updated probability assessments by two. If people think that a
subsequent attack is certain, they should discount that to fifty percent; if they
think the second attack will kill millions, they should cut the estimate in half.
As a result, people will be less willing to permit police to single out Arabs or
Muslims for suspicion, shut down the airports, and eavesdrop on the mails.
The argument depends on several assumptions, all of them troublesome.
First, it must be the case that people can, while panicking, accurately identify
the conditions under which they panic: That is, they must be able to determine
that their current probability estimates are made under the relevant conditions
and not independently of these conditions. People must think, "Because there
was a terrorist attack six months ago, my current predictions are inaccurate;"
and not, "The terrorist attack occurred long enough ago for me to recover my
cognitive abilities." Second, the conditions must actually be correlated with
panic. If the rule is "discount one's assessment of the risks if a terrorist attack
occurred within two (four?, ten?) years," then it must be the case that people's
assessments are exaggerated within that time frame, and to a sufficient extent,
and not reasonably accurate in a substantial portion of the cases. Third, the
conditions must be capable of being specified in advance with reasonable
accuracy and must in fact generate more benefits than costs. People must be
able to know what kind of events are likely to generate fear and thus interfere
with probability estimates, as well as the time frame during which the effect
lasts: airplane crashes, terrorist attacks, military interventions, and the like, all
with their own associated time frames. If the conditions are incorrectly
specified, then the rule will result in people discounting their own beliefs when
they are accurate and thus failing to deliver an adequate response to an
authentic emergency. But because we have so little information about how
people exaggerate risks when afraid and how much of a discount is appropriate,
it is hard to believe that any rule would improve behavior.
Critics of accommodation do not typically argue that detailed rules such as
these should be institutionalized. Instead, they attempt to evade the difficult
calculus illustrated by the discussion so far by flatly asserting that, whatever the
optimal rule, emergency policies will be better if they comply with normal
constitutional restrictions than if they do not.
There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it does not
fully escape the psychological unrealism of intrapersonal self-restraint. People
in the grip of fear will rationalize their decisions on the basis of their
exaggerated assessment of the threat. Because they think that the threat is
significant, they think that a compelling government interest justifies intrusions
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on civil liberties. Although it is possible that they choose less restrictive laws
than they would under the accommodation view, we doubt that officials in the
grip of fear are capable of making such fine distinctions. Fear, according to the
simple view endorsed by the panic thesis, focuses attention on the threat and
away from civil liberties. Officials will reach for any policy that addresses the
threat and are likely to find a compelling government interest in the fact of the
emergency. This is the lesson of history. One can say in favor of the strict
enforcement rule that it is, with respect to psychological realism, superior to
intrapersonal self-restraint. Intrapersonal self-restraint requires people to
discount their own judgments, whereas the strict enforcement rule appears to
tell them to act the same during emergencies as otherwise, or not too
differently. But it is not much of an improvement.
The second objection is even more important. Like all rules, the strict
enforcement view reduces decision costs through overinclusion. The strict
enforcement rule applies to officials who remain calm despite the emergency
and prevents them from implementing rational policies. It also applies to fearful
officials whose policies might be based on exaggerated notions of risk but still
be better policies than those available under the Constitution strictly construed.
A policy of detaining immigrants for example, may be based on an exaggerated
notion of the threat, but still be preferable to no policy at all. If unconstrained
officials choose policies that are biased against civil liberties, it remains
unlikely that strictly enforcing the Constitution rather than making
accommodations, will ensure that policies that reflect the optimal balancing of
liberty and security will be chosen.
The panic rule and the strict enforcement rule reflect different tradeoffs
between discretion and overinclusion, but neither is satisfactory. The strict
enforcement rule does not, in the end, escape the charge of psychological
unrealism. Both rules require people to act as if they did not believe their own
judgments-the first, by recognizing that fear may hamper their judgments; the
second, by recognizing relatively objective conditions associated with fear that
may hamper their judgments. The first vests too much discretion in the person
who, by hypothesis, cannot trust his own judgment. The second reduces
discretion but then relies on the wholly unsupported claim that the objective
conditions can be identified and specified in advance and are sufficiently
correlated with periods of public and official fear.
3. Insulation of decisionmakers.

The third mechanism is to vest emotionally disciplined people with
political authority and insulate them from popular opinion. Emotionally
disciplined people are less likely to panic than are normal people and thus more
likely to choose good policies if unconstrained by popular opinion; but they
might rationally implement policies demanded by a panicking citizenry if the
alternative is ejection from office. There are two versions of this argument. One
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possibility is to reduce popular accountability at all times, so that political
leaders will be insulated when an emergency occurs. The other possibility is to
vest authority in particular individuals when an emergency is identified or
declared; for example, the president could declare an emergency and the
military would then have temporary police powers. 67 Both versions assume that
the people with leadership positions will actually be calmer during an
emergency than the public: ordinary politicians in the first case, and the
president (at the point of declaring the emergency) and military officials (after
the emergency is declared) in the second case. Both versions also assume that
the insulation materials cannot be pierced by public sentiment.
These assumptions are all questionable. The U.S. Constitution already
insulates political officials from popular pressures to some extent-more so
than a direct democracy, for example-and it is probable that executive
officials, who are constantly exposed to crises large and small, do not panic as
frequently as ordinary people do. But the usual fears about relaxing
constitutional protections during emergencies are based on the assumption that
elected officials do panic sometimes; so the fact that they are insulated already
is no comfort. Insulating them further would be perverse: It would make
officials less accountable during normal times so that they would be less likely
to be influenced by panicking citizens during emergencies. But that just means
that civil liberties will be violated more often during times of calm. Civil
libertarians don't want to reduce civil liberties during times of calm; they want
government officials to respect normal constitutional barriers during
emergencies. If government officials are not willing to do that-either because
they are panicking or because they need to respond rationally to a threat-then
giving them greater insulation against popular fears will not improve their
decisions.
It also is questionable whether elected officials can resist political pressures
when citizens panic. A large part of dealing with a national emergency is to
calm the fears of citizens. Government's usual response is to channel and dam
up these fears rather than dismiss them as irrational. If the public believes that a
threat exists, official assurances to the contrary do no good-instead, it is
evidence to the public that the government is unprepared and insufficiently
vigorous-and waving the Constitution at the public will not help when the
public believes that the Constitution itself is being threatened.
Finally, people do not usually choose officials on the basis of their ability
to stay calm during emergencies. There are too many other relevant
considerations. Most politicians are elected on the basis of their ability to
deliver the goods during ordinary times. Although sometimes a politician's
background contains indications of emotional discipline, the latter is not a
salient issue in political contests.

67. See ROSSITER, supra note 4, at 39, 139-50, 215-17 (describing historical examples).
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What can be said for the insulation method is that it is psychologically
realistic. If emotionally disciplined people can be identified in advance and
given positions of authority, then it is not psychologically unrealistic to assume
that they will make decisions in a calm way. Strict enforcement of the
Constitution, then, will ensure that they do not violate civil liberties for rational
but impermissible reasons, such as political advantage; but the compelling
interest standard will give them the freedom to make proper responses to the
emergency. Along the dimension of psychological realism, then, the insulation
method dominates the other two rules. But the insulation method does much
worse on the cost-benefit dimension. Insulated officials are not democratically
responsive. This means that they are not likely to make good policy choices and
that the public will not trust them with significant power.
Federal judges are highly insulated officials in the American constitutional
system. For this reason, civil libertarians argue that judges are well positioned
to guard civil liberties against the excesses of panic during wartime and other
emergency periods. Yet judges themselves do not appear to share this view.
American judges have almost always deferred to the executive during
emergencies. 68 The reason is apparently that the judges have done the costbenefit balancing that the civil libertarians have neglected and found
themselves wanting. 69 If insulation gives them the advantage of calm, the price
is lack of information and lack of power. 70 Judges do not have the information
that executives have and are reluctant to second guess them. 7 1 They also do not
have access to the levers of power, so they can only delay a response to
emergency by entertaining legal objections to it. They do not have such access
because such power cannot be given to people who are not politically
accountable. Finally, the assumption that judges are less swayed by passion

68. Issacharoff and Pildes argue that judges are less deferential during emergencies
than is commonly thought; but their examination of the cases shows that judges are
deferential during emergencies; it is just that they are more deferential when the executive
and legislature speak with one voice than when the executive acts alone. See Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism:
An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime (July 18, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors). An empirical study supports the conventional wisdom; see
Epstein, et al., supra note 2 (finding that during war the probability that the Supreme Court
finds for a defendant in a civil rights or liberties case falls by fifteen percent).
69. For explicit discussions, by judges, of their own lack of information in wartime
cases, see, for example, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 343 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., concurring
in the denial of rehearing en banc); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 471-74 (4th Cir.
2003).
70. Thus, the calmness/information tradeoff mirrors the much more frequently
discussed neutrality/information tradeoff. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
Independence allows judges to be calm and neutral but deprives them of information they
need to evaluate the actions of the other branches.
71.

DAVID BONNER, EMERGENCY POWERS IN PEACETIME 286 (1985).
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than elected officials is not obviously correct; Justice Jackson appears to have
thought that judges are equally vulnerable. 7 2 All of this explains why during
emergencies judges rarely feel that they have their ordinary peacetime authority
to interfere with executive decisionmaking.
Indeed, the champions of civil liberties during emergencies in American
history have usually been officials in the executive or legislative branches, not
the justices of the Supreme Court. During the Palmer raids, the Attomey
General's attempt to exploit public fears for political gain was resisted by the
acting Secretary of Labor, whose approval was needed for deportations. 73 The
Labor Department, unlike the Supreme Court, had the political power to block
or delay deportations because its expertise about, and authority over, the
regulation of immigration, gave it legitimacy. During World War II, many
members of the Roosevelt Administration opposed the internment of JapaneseAmericans, and though they could not prevent the military's decision, they
ensured that the interment would be carried out in as humane a fashion as
possible; 74 it was also the Justice Department that opposed Roosevelt's
schemes to squelch dissent. 75 During the Cold War, although neither Truman
nor Eisenhower took brave public stands against McCarthy, they criticized his
methods and tried to undermine his influence, and he was eventually defeated
by opposition from high level appointees in the executive branch and elected
officials in the legislative branch. The Supreme Court was, throughout these
events, largely passive. It did not have the political authority to oppose the
executive (or legislative) branch during emergencies, and so it did not act. The
justices could not have made the case that they understood the nature of the
emergency better than executive officials did. Only officials within the political
branches, who could make a credible case that they had better information and
better motives than the opponents of civil liberties, and had the proper
institutional responsibility for handling the emergency, had the necessary
public legitimacy.
F. Strict Enforcement as a Precommitment Device
The strict enforcement view relies on a simple and much criticized theory
that constitutional or other rules can be properly thought of as rational (good)
precommitments against emotional (bad) decisions. The old metaphor is that of
Ulysses being tied to the mast so that he would not yield to the songs of the
sirens. But the analogy is false, as a recent literature has emphasized. 76 Because

72. See the quotation from Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948),
supra note 20.
73. See Tushnet, supra note 19, at 289.

74. ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 99-100, 102-03.
75. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 68, at 53.
76. This appears to be the general conclusion of Elster, who expresses skepticism about
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the sirens were both irresistible and unambiguously bad, prior commitment to
stay on the ship was an unambiguously good choice. In addition, Ulysses could
trust his crew. Fear, though, plays a valuable role as well as negative role; and
no commitment device can be designed in advance to prevent fear from
influencing behavior, nor is there reason to think that broad constitutional
restrictions on executive power would produce good outcomes by reducing the
influence of fear. It is perverse for a government to commit itself not to respond
vigorously to emergencies. A purely rational response to a crisis sounds good
in the abstract, but some motivational oomph is necessary as well, and when
fear is needed to supply that motivation, constitutional restrictions on its
influence can do much harm.
Legal scholars dwell on the many historical events in which fear appeared
to produce bad policy choices. These are the Red Scares, the Banking Panics,
and so forth. Fears about Hitler may have resulted in appeasement rather than
resistance. But there are as many cases where the absence of fear may have
resulted in policies that were weak when they should have been vigorous. Here
we count the failed Weimar Government before Hitler 77 and the Kerensky
Government before Lenin. Conventional wisdom blames unpreparedness for
the 9/11 attacks not on lack of information but on bureaucratic inertia. Leading
officials assessed the risks correctly but could not summon the necessary
political will. Fear changed this instantly. In the United States before World
War II, public complacency about American security behind two oceans
hamstrung public officials who were better informed. Roosevelt sought to stir
up fear so as to motivate the war effort, in contrast to his effort to suppress fear
during the early years of the Great Depression. His contrary actions just show
how fear has both good and bad effects, and fear that can be disabling in one
context may provide needed motivation in another.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper has been to criticize two common arguments

against the longstanding judicial practice of deferring to the political branches,
and especially to the executive branch, during wartime and other emergencies.
We have shown that the ratchet argument and the panic argument depend on
inadequately justified conceptual, empirical, and normative premises. In
advancing our critique we have assumed that the current level of deference is
appropriate, but we have not tried to defend this current level. Our point is that
the claim that constitutional constraints can be relied on to counteract popular passions. See
ELSTER, supra note 10, at 157-61. In this book, Elster repudiates some of the optimism of his
earlier work. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY (rev. ed. 1984); see also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999)
(criticizing the commitment argument).
77. The Weimar government had strong emergency powers, but they were used more
against the left than against the right. See ROSSITER, supra note 4, at 39-41.

HeinOnline -- 56 Stan. L. Rev. 643 2003-2004

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:605

if one wants to criticize the current level of deference, one ought to depend on
arguments different from the ratchet and panic arguments.
What would these arguments be? As courts have long recognized, they face
a tradeoff between two considerations. On the one hand, the executive branch
has advantages that courts lack: information about current threats to national
security, and control over the military, police, and other institutions that can
meet a threat. In order to counter threats to national security, the executive must
be able to act on its information swiftly, without having to defend its sources
(and thereby risk compromising them), rely on its own accumulated experience,
and issue orders that will be obeyed with no delay. Judicial scrutiny can only
interfere with forceful executive action. On the other hand, the officials who
hold executive power for the time being may attempt to extend their power or
to squash political opponents. Judicial deference would permit these abuses to
occur. So a potential cost of deference is executive (or congressional-executive,
as the case may be) abuse, and the benefit of deference is the reduction, as a
result of noninterference by judges, of risks to national security and to other
goods protected by the executive.
Constitutional practice during normal times reflects one possible
tradeoff between these considerations. Police must obtain warrants but not if
they are in hot pursuit; the press can be made to pay damages for disclosing
government secrets but not usually enjoined; and so forth. Strict enforcement of
constitutional rights, rather than deference to the executive, is justified in
normal times because the cost of deference exceeds the benefit. In the case of
emergency, however, the relevant benefit from deference is forceful executive
action against a threat to national security; this benefit is higher than the benefit
of reducing crime. By contrast, the cost of deference during emergencies and
during normal times remains constant: this is the cost of abuse of executive
power for political ends. Because the cost of deference remains constant, while
the benefit of deference rises during an emergency, judges should be more
deferential during emergencies than during normal times. And they are.
However, there is a difference between saying that deference should be higher
during emergencies and saying that the current level of judicial deferencewhat we have called "accommodation"--is correct. To show that the latter
proposition is true, one would have to describe in more detail the relative
institutional capacities of the executive and the judiciary. If, for example, courts
can process national security information securely, rapidly, and accurately, then
judicial deference need not be as high as otherwise. All we have before us is
evidence about what judges think, and judges appear to have doubts about
whether they can do this.
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